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TH E KATHEKON :  
A Report  on Some Recent  W ork at  Cornel l * 
Tad BRENNAN 
Cornell University 
Jacob Klein, a former Cornell student, has recently proposed what I 
believe to be an extremely interesting and profitable interpretation of the 
role of indifferents in Stoic ethics.1 Klein’s proposal is in some ways similar 
to some positions that I have taken in the past, and so I find it very 
congenial. But it develops these ideas in a much more precise way, and with 
consequences that are more radical than anything I had seen. I find it very 
plausible, although it requires me to abandon certain interpretations that I 
have published in the past. Its consequences for our understanding of the 
kathekon in particular are very extensive. With the help of some current 
Cornell students, I have been exploring the consequences of Klein’s 
proposal. In this paper, I present some of these explorations. 
I .  An Introduction to  Klein’s  Proposal :  
Promotedness  as  Semiotic  Value  
In several of my earlier publications, I proposed that the kind of value 
that promoted indifferents possess, their axia, should be understood as 
having a special restriction to deliberation about the future.2 Here are two 
representative quotations: 
...indifferent things like health and disease do have a sort of value called 
‘selective value’ (axia eklektike); we might instead translate it ‘planning-
 
* First I would like to thank the organizers of the journée d’études at the Centre Jean 
Pépin for their invitation and their kindness, esp. Dr. Wilfried Kühn. Next I thank my 
students and former students in Cornell who have so many excellent ideas, esp. Jacob Klein, 
whose views are starting to appear in his own publications. For advice about revising this 
paper for publication, I wish to thank J.-B. Gourinat and W. Kühn again, who sent me 
copious and insightful notes. And as always, my deepest thanks go to Liz Karns. 
1. Klein 2010. 
2. And so for demoted indifferents and their disvalue, apaxia.  “Promoted” and “de-
moted” translate proegmenon and apoproegmenon.  Translations that suggest connections to 
preference in the contemporary sense are bound to mislead, see e.g. Barney 2003, 310 fn. 18. 
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value’ in order to bring out the fact that it is only relevant to future-
oriented impulses.3 When we are already in possession of an indifferent, its 
‘planning-value’ falls out of consideration and the object is purely indiffer-
ent; thus we should react with equal equanimity to our possession of health 
or disease considered as a fait accompli. But when surveying the future, the 
fact that health has greater ‘planning-value’ than disease (indeed disease has 
selective ‘disvalue’) gives us rational grounds for pursuing health and avoid-
ing disease.4  
...the kind of value that indifferent things have is a value that matters only 
for choosing them or avoiding them, selecting them or disselecting them. 
That means it is a value that they have only in prospect, only when con-
sidered as items in the future. Health has some of this value, and more of it 
than disease does; that’s why, other things being equal, it is reasonable for 
me to select health. But the value it has might be called a sort of ‘planning-
value’ only; it matters when we are making plans for the future, and dis-
appears when the future becomes the present. It is reasonable for me to 
take steps today to maintain my health tomorrow, because my health to-
morrow has more planning-value today than does my being sick tomorrow. 
But when it gets to be tomorrow, the ‘pay-off’ values of my health and sick-
ness are the same: they are both completely indifferent.5  
Klein’s own work approached the question of axia from a different 
problematic: he wanted to clarify the relation of indifferents to our pursuit 
of happiness as our end. In particular, Klein argues against the view that 
promoted indifferents have a kind of value that is either teleologically 
independent of our happiness, or is instrumental to our happiness. Indif-
ferents cannot have a kind of value that is independent and autonomous of 
happiness: that is ruled out by the Stoic claims that happiness alone is our 
end, and that this is the thing for the sake of which we do everything. On 
the other hand, the value of indifferents cannot be instrumental in the 
sense of bringing about, contributing to, or constituting some portion of 
our happiness through our possession of them. This would make our fail-
ure to possess them or acquire them destructive of our happiness. Both of 
these views, he argues, are incompatible with the Stoics’ fundamental con-
viction that happiness alone is our end, and that virtue is sufficient for it.  
But if a promoted indifferent is neither worth pursuing independently 
of some relation to happiness, nor instrumental to happiness, then how 
should we understand the rationality of pursuing it? The Stoic doctrine of 
the end tells us that we have reason to pursue things whose possession can 
 
3. Stobaeus II 83,13-84, 1 (SVF 3.124 = LS 58D). The term is attributed to Antipater, 
but I take it to represent Chrysippean doctrine. 
4. Brennan 2003, p. 263-264. 
5. Brennan 2005, p. 101. 
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contribute to or constitute our happiness. If something is good, whether 
intrinsically or instrumentally, its goodness is a reason to pursue it. But 
what reason can there be to pursue things that make no contribution to 
our good?  
Klein’s very radical proposal is that we should understand indifferents 
as giving us reasons of a different sort, what he calls “epistemic reasons”. 
Typically, we think of valuable things in the world as giving us reasons to 
act. But epistemic reasons are, in the first instance, reasons to believe, rather 
than reasons to act.6 And Klein’s proposal is that information about pro-
moted and demoted things around us gives us reason to believe proposi-
tions about what we should do. The value of food or health is not a reason 
to possess it. Rather, it is a reason to believe that we should pursue it.7 
Because I find the language of “reasons” somewhat artificial and hard to 
understand, I want to present Klein’s proposal in different terms. Klein, I 
think, can be understood as proposing that selective value is semiotic value. 
Every indifferent item that we consider, when deciding what to do, gives us 
signs and indications, pointing us towards some actions and away from 
other actions. The fact that food is a promoted indifferent is an indica-
tion—in itself, perhaps, only a weak one—that I ought to pursue it. The 
 
6. Klein 2010, chapter 4, p. 37: “preferred and dispreferred indifferents do not enter 
into the deliberations of the Stoic agent as practical objectives at all.” 
7. But are there not some promoted indifferents that cannot be construed in this way, 
because they cannot be made the objects of choices? Good birth (eugeneia) for instance: 
how can I make any choice that could affect whether my parents were noble or not? Ian 
Hensley (a member of my seminar) has suggested that I might select good birth for my 
children, by selecting the right sort of mate. Another kind of answer is attested for some 
Stoics in Stobaeus 2.107, 14-108, 4, where we are told that both euphuïa and eugeneia can 
arise from practice and training (melete, kataskeue). A good nature or a good birth (reinter-
preted, as so often in Stoicism) will be whatever state of your character gives you an aptitude 
for acquiring virtue. And this is both an indifferent (since it is only a potential for virtue, 
not virtue itself), and also something that one can pursue. That disposes of the potentially 
problematic cases of eugeneia and euphuïa; but what if there are other indifferents that seem 
incapable of change through our actions? Certainly (not speaking as Stoics now) we can 
conceive of personal characteristics that are 1) indifferent in being irrelevant to virtue; 2) 
nonetheless preferable in some weaker sense; but 3) immune to change by any action on the 
part of the agent. E.g., having a perfect ear for pitches: that is an agreeable or desirable thing 
to have, even if it is indifferent so far as virtue and happiness go.  But if it is an immutable 
personal attribute, then there is no action I can take towards having it. Would the Stoics 
have called this a promoted indifferent? No; not if we can trust D.L. 7.104 and Stobaeus 
2.82, 8-10.  For there, the stimulation of horme, and ekloge in particular, are made essential 
to the indifferents that are promoted and demoted (as opposed to the hapax adiaphora). 
What cannot result in action is not a horme, and what I cannot hope to change, I cannot 
have a horme towards. (A mere velleity, I think, would not count as a Stoic horme). So 
anything that is non-contingent (e.g. the identity of my ancestors) cannot be a promoted 
indifferent. 
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fact that eating when I have a fever is likely to make me more sick, and that 
illness is a demoted indifferent, is an indication—again, only a defeasible 
one—that I should not eat.  
This proposal fits very well with the idea that whatever value promoted 
things have is strictly limited to future-tensed considerations. There is no 
value in possessing them, other than the value that they have for informing 
our deliberations about what to do in the future. They have value as signs 
and indications of what we should do, but (whether we interpreted them 
correctly or not) that value becomes irrelevant after we have made our deci-
sion and acted.8  This much of Klein’s proposal I had already anticipated.9 
But Klein observes, in addition, that this makes a fundamental change 
to the way that we think about the role of aggregation and trade-offs in 
deliberation. If the kind of value that promoted indifferents have depended 
on our eventual possession of them, then our deliberation might take the 
form of a maximizing calculation: act so as to maximize the amount of 
value in the outcome. We would consider alternative courses of action, cal-
culate (through some metretic art) which course would produce the great-
est net value, and pursue it for that reason.  
But if we think of the value as semiotic value, then the comparison of 
alternative plans is a different kind of activity: it is the examination of 
evidence, in order to see where the preponderance of evidence lies. And this 
 
8. W. Kühn helped me to clarify several points here. In the quotes above from Brennan 
2003 and 2005 I said that indifferents lose their axia when I come to possess them, and this 
is wrong. I was confusing two questions: 1) when I come to possess some promoted or 
demoted indifferent, do I now have anything that I should place non-epistemic value on? 
(answer: no); 2) do the promoted or demoted indifferents that I come to possess still have 
some epistemic value even after I possess them? (answer: yes).  It is clear (from, e.g. Cicero’s 
de fin. 3.60) that when I deliberate about the future, I consider both the indifferents that I 
can aim for in the future, and the indifferents that I currently possess. Both kinds, the pre-
sent and the future, are informative and significant about what it is reasonable for me to do 
in the future. But of course when I possess some health in the future, this has no more non-
epistemic value than when I possess some disease in the future—neither makes me happier 
or more miserable, makes my life more or less complete, or gives me any greater cause for 
satisfaction or regret. They are, to that extent, equally indifferent. But this does not mean 
that their value for deliberation is indifferent: they have different informational content, 
and suggest different courses of future action.  My current illness, e.g., may give me more 
reason to think that suicide is reasonable. Once we have said that axia eklektike is semiotic 
or epistemic value, there is no reason to deny that the indifferents already in my possession 
still have value of this sort.  
9. In Brennan 1999, I wrote, “[E]ven if the Sage is an infallible discoverer of virtuous 
acts, that is because he is an infallible tracker of the divine mind, not because his decisions 
are an originating source of new ethical facts. What *makes* it the case that it is the ethical 
thing to do is something strictly over and above the Sage's deliberations, e.g. the mind of 
God and the state of the cosmos.  It's just that the Sage's deliberations about indifferents 
were exactly the medium through which he discovered this fact about the mind of God.” 
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changes how we think about the interaction between positive and negative. 
In a maximizing exercise, the desirability of an outcome must take into 
account any negative consequences that are produced, and subtract them 
from the positive consequences.  Perhaps selling the furniture in order to 
buy food was, when all of the alternatives are considered, the best course of 
action to pursue. But the loss of the furniture still detracts from the good-
ness of the outcome. We may feel that we have reason to regret the loss, or 
think that an outcome that allowed us to acquire food and retain our 
furniture would have been even better than any of the alternatives available 
to us. 
When we consider signs and evidence, however, there is no such per-
sistent loss after they have played their role. Suppose that we are trying to 
divine the location of our car-keys. There are various signs that point to 
their being in the bedroom, and other signs that point away from their 
being in the bedroom. Prior to the discovery of the keys, these signs must 
be weighed against each other, and the weight of evidence in one direction 
does tend to diminish the weight of evidence in the other direction. But 
that canceling effect ends when the keys are found. Once we have found 
our keys in the bedroom, led there by the preponderance of evidence, the 
contrary signs that suggested they were elsewhere do not retain any force, 
or diminish the force of the signs that led us to the discovery.10 Nor is there 
any sense in which we might regret that the discounted signs turned out to 
be false, or think that it would have been better somehow if all of the signs, 
both those pointing towards the bed-room and those pointing away from 
it, could have been simultaneously true.11  
Consider how this affects our understanding of the pursuit of indiffer-
ents in Stoicism.  We know that food is a promoted indifferent, and health 
is a promoted indifferent; each has some value, and that value acts as an 
indicator, in typical cases, that we should pursue the acquisition of food 
and of health.12 However, in some cases the doctor will explain to us that 
 
10. It does not follow that we have discounted the value of an entire class of signs; other 
signs very like the signs that turned out to be wrong in this case may well be reliable in fu-
ture cases.  
11. There is a different phenomenon that should not be confused with this, in which we 
do have a positive desire that the discredited signs should somehow be accounted for. Typic-
ally, e.g., I leave my keys with my glasses, and my glasses were in the front hall; that was one 
of the reasons I thought my keys were not in the bedroom. This anomaly might prompt me 
to look for an explanation: how did my keys come to be separated from my glasses?  But 
wanting the discredited signs to be explained or accounted for is not the same thing as wish-
ing that both sets of signs, somehow, could have turned out true.  
12. J.-B. Gourinat pointed out to me that the standard lists of promoted indifferents 
contain such items as health, wealth, and life, but do not mention food. He wondered whe-
ther it is a category mistake—or even a vice—to treat food as a promoted indifferent. I think 
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we should fast in order to recover our health. For the meanwhile, that is, we 
cannot simultaneously acquire both food and health.  If we think that the 
axia that these two promoted indifferents have is some kind of possession-
value, then we will feel that our situation is an unfortunate one: no matter 
what we do, feast or fast, we will wind up acquiring less possession-value 
than if we could have both food and health simultaneously.  But if we think 
of their axia as semiotic value, then we think of the general promotedness 
of food and health as incomplete and defeasible signs directing either to eat 
or not to eat, as the further details of the case may go. Once we use them in 
our deliberations to figure out what it is that Zeus bids us to do (eat, say, 
and forgo our health), then we do not think of the resultant situation as 
one in which we have less of any value than we could have had.  The value 
of health was exhausted by its role in giving me information about the will 
of Zeus, its semiotic value. In this case, it turned out to be a misleading 
indicator, like some piece of evidence suggesting that my keys are in the 
hallway, when they are actually in the bedroom. After I have discovered 
what to do, and discovered that pursuing my health was not the thing to 
do, I can dismiss considerations of health (in this case) as I would dismiss a 
misleading piece of evidence. The possession-values of food without health, 
health without food, and both food-and-health together, are all equal: they 
have no possession-value whatsoever.  Accordingly, we have no reason to 
regret our current situation, or to think that fate has cheated us of anything 
worth having.13 
 
there is sufficient evidence of an indirect kind to allow us to feel confident that food is a 
promoted indifferent. In many of our sources, we learn that indifferents (or promoted 
things or things according to nature) can be divided into those that are promoted etc. 
through themselves (kath’ hauta), and those that are productive of the first kind (poietika) 
or are promoted etc. through other things (di’ hetera). See Stobaeus 2.80,14 and 2.82, 20; 
D.L. 7.107; Cicero de Fin. 3.20 and 3.56 (partim per se ipsa praeposita, partim quod aliquid 
efficiunt; aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat). We are told that health is 
promoted in and through itself, and although we are never told what things are productive 
of health, it seems a safe inference that food would be among those things. I suspect that the 
distinction in Epictetus 2.6.9 between the things that are according to nature and the things 
that are more naturally suited towards the acquisition of those things that are according to 
nature may also be a distinction between the per se promoted indifferents and the product-
ive or instrumental promoted indifferents. 
13. Both W. Kühn and J.-B. Gourinat objected to my invocations of the will of Zeus, 
Kühn in particular because “la volonté de Zeus n'est accessible qu'au sage,” whereas all 
agents need to deliberate about what it is kathekon to do.  I agree that only Sages have know-
ledge, but I think that even non-Sages can have some weaker kinds of access (e.g. true belief, 
well-supported belief, or even katalepsis) to the will of Zeus.  For instance, anyone who 
accepts the Stoic doctrine of divine determinism can see that it was the will of Zeus that it 
should rain yesterday—rhechthen de te nepios egno. And while only Sages have the know-
ledge of physics, any progressor may acquire more and more true beliefs, and even kataleptic 
beliefs, about the natural world; and learning about what happens by nature is equivalent to 
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II .  The Consequences  for  the  Theory of  Impulse  
That’s a brief sketch of Klein’s proposal, though more details will 
emerge. And my initial reaction was to reject the proposal, because it con-
flicted with a different view that I have espoused in the past—wrongly, as I 
now think. This is the view that every impulse in Stoicism, every horme, has 
two parts. In one part, the horme mentions an evaluative term such as 
“good”, “bad”, “promoted” or “demoted”. And in the other part, the horme 
asserts that it is right or necessary or kathekon to respond to that value in 
some way, e.g. by pursuing or avoiding it. 
There is good evidence that this two-part analysis applies at least to the 
emotions (pathe) of pleasure (hedone) and pain (lupe). We are told by 
Andronicus (SVF 3.391), for instance, that pain is “an irrational contract-
ion; or a fresh opinion of a present evil, at which they think it necessary to 
contract,” and that pleasure is “an irrational elation, or a fresh opinion of a 
present good, at which they think it necessary to be elated.” Stobaeus (SVF 
3.394) tells us, similarly, that pain is a “contraction of the soul that is dis-
obedient to reason, and the cause of it is believing that a fresh evil is present 
at which it is appropriate (kathekei) that one contract,” and that pleasure  is 
“an elation of the soul that is disobedient to reason, and the cause of it is 
believing that a fresh good is present, at which it is appropriate (kathekei) 
that one be elated.”14  (Note, since the point will come up again, the pre-
sence of the word “kathekon” in the definition of the emotions).15  
Each of these emotions, then, is a belief that something is a good or bad, 
of such a sort that one believes, in addition, that one should be elated or 
should contract in response to it.  
 
learning about the will of Zeus. D.L. 7.87-88 tells us that when we live in accordance with 
nature, we are living in accordance with the nomos koinos, and with the orthos logos, and that 
this is the same as Zeus. I prefer to describe things in terms of the will of Zeus (despite my 
personal preference for laïcité) both because it is more vivid, and because it emphasizes 
certain historical continuities with theological ethics as it occurs in e.g. Socrates and Plato. 
But any reader who wishes to replace all references to the will of Zeus in my article with 
references to what happens in accordance with nature should feel free to do so.  
14. There are many details here that deserve greater scrutiny, but are not relevant to this 
paper. E.g., the text in Stobaeus makes it look as though “prosphaton” modifies kakon and 
agathon. It would be awkward to take it adverbially with the infinitive “doxazein”. And yet, 
Galen’s quotations of Posidonius make “prosphatos” modify the noun “doxa” (SVF 3.463, 
481). Is it the opinion or the evil that is fresh? Secondly, there is a very significant difference 
between Andronicus’ formulae, in which the pathos simply is the doxa, and Stobaeus for-
mulae, in which the doxa is the cause of the pathos. All of this I must defer for another time. 
15. Cicero’s definitions in the Tusculans (4.7, 14) are close translations of these, e.g. “est 
ergo aegritudo opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse 
videatur”. 
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We are told that pleasure and pain have the two-part structure, and also 
that they can be described simply as “irrational elation” or “irrational con-
traction”. The other two emotions—desire and fear—are not explicitly said 
to have the two-part structure, but they are explicitly described as “irra-
tional pursuit” and “irrational avoidance,” and on the basis of this I have 
assumed that they could also be given two-part analyses to match the two-
part analyses of pleasure and pain.16 (If the shorter descriptions can be ex-
panded in the case of pleasure and pain, then why not in the case of desire 
and fear?) The eupatheiai are also described as “rational elation”, “rational 
pursuit”, and “rational avoidance”, and said to be the “opposites” of the 
emotions. On this basis, I have assumed that each of the eupatheiai also has 
the two-part structure.  
Finally, I assumed that selection and disselection, since they are im-
pulses, would have the same two-part structure that I had attributed to the 
other impulses.17 But in their case, the impulse would be a belief that these 
things were promoted or demoted indifferents, instead of beliefs that they 
were good or bad.  
As should be clear, there were many steps of interpretive intervention—
assumptions, simplifications, and regimentations—in this line of thought. 
The reward was a regular, orderly, and systematic account of impulse, 
which (it seemed to me) respected a central tenet of ancient action theory, 
that action only emerges from evaluation.  Rational pursuit, or any volunt-
ary, intentional pursuit, is a response to the antecedent perception of value. 
The purest form of this tenet is found in the Socratic dictum that desire is 
for the good. The suggestion that selection is for the promoted—i.e. that 
the impulse of selection only arises as a response to a perception of a sort of 
analogue of goodness, sc. promotedness—seemed to me a modest, minimal 
 
16. E.g. in Brennan 2005, p. 98. 
17. And yet even for the claim that ekloge and apekloge are hormai, there is less direct 
evidence than I would like.  D.L. 7.104 says that promoteds and demoteds are “stimulative 
of horme and aphorme, which is why the one group are selected (eklegetai), and the other dis-
selected (apeklegetai).” In the famous Foot Fragment (Epictetus 2.6.9), Chrysippus seems to 
contrast his being eklektikon of health with his having a horme for illness, in a way that 
makes most sense if ekloge is a kind of horme. (That remains a plausible inference even if 
Chrysippus is here using the verb horman to refer to a species of impulse, not to the entire 
genus of impulse. He would still be contrasting a species of impulse, directed towards illness, 
with ekloge directed towards health.) Plutarch (1071A = SVF 3.195) treats ekloge and lepsis 
as similar terms, and Stobaeus (2.75 = SVF 3.131) in turn treats lepsis as analogous to hai-
resis, which is certainly a kind of horme (Stobaeus 2.87 = SVF 3.173)  On the whole I think 
it is a fairly safe inference that ekloge is a kind of horme; but it would be nice to have more 
secure evidence. W. Kühn reminded me that “ἐκλογή ne figure pas dans la liste des espèces 
de l'impulsion pratique, que transmet Stobée II 87, 14-16,” but I do not take this as strong 
evidence for or against. That list is far from exhaustive—we know of many subspecies of 
impulse that are not included in it.  
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development of that dictum, which respected its essential spirit, and so 
respected the Central Tenet, that rational action is the outcome of 
evaluation. 
But my previous accounts of impulse must be wrong if Jacob Klein’s 
proposal is right. And I am currently inclined to think that they are wrong, 
at least so far as selection goes.18 
Here is the source of the conflict. Jacob thinks that axia constitutes a 
reason for belief, rather than a reason for action: seeing that the food is a 
promoted indifferent gives me reason to believe I should pursue it, instead 
of giving me reason to possess it. The only value that promoted indifferents 
have is their value as signs and indicators of what I should do, but I do not 
gain anything “of value” (in the non-epistemic sense) by possessing them.  
But he also thinks that, in some way, judgments about axia do result in 
impulses: if the indication given by the food is not counter-indicated by 
any other signs, then I will have an impulse to eat. And my Central Tenet 
claims that if an impulse eventuates, then an evaluation—i.e. the attri-
bution of non-epistemic value—must have occurred. If I believe that I 
should pursue it, then this “should” must supervene on some sort of ante-
cedent evaluation: perhaps the evaluation that the food is a good thing, or 
that the food is a promoted thing, or perhaps some new value other than 
goodness or promotedness is brought into play—that is not ruled out by 
the Central Tenet. But the Central tenet does demand that impulses super-
vene on attributions of value of some non-epistemic kind.19 If I have a 
belief that I should pursue X, then this must be a belief whose real structure 
is believing that X has some value V of such a sort that I should pursue X 
because of its V.20  
This in turn means that Klein’s treatment of axia as a “reason to 
believe” rather than a “reason to possess” simply means that our belief must 
be the belief that there is some further, additional “reason to act”, some 
further value. The further value won’t be goodness or badness, because the 
objects in question are indifferents pursued as such. And the further value 
won’t be promotedness or demotedness, since those are being treated epis-
temically as signs, rather than as (non-epistemic) values. What, then, is the 
new value on which the impulse supervenes?  And furthermore, how will 
 
18. For the present, I am still inclined to think that the pathe and eupatheiai do all have 
the two-part structure that is attested explicitly for pleasure and pain. 
19. “Value” here not as a translation of axia, but as a category including good, bad, pro-
moted, demoted, and any other properties relevantly like them. 
20. Or alternatively, the belief must be the conclusion of an argument that has some 
other beliefs about value among its premises. 
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this new value succeed in avoiding the dilemma21 that Klein posed for the 
older interpretation of promoted axia?  
So if we hold on to the Central Tenet, then the Klein proposal seems 
idle; it says “the object’s axia is not the value on which selection super-
venes; it is instead a sign that the object has some other, hitherto unknown 
value on which selection supervenes.” If that were what the proposal 
amounted to, then it would be wiser to keep life simple by making axia the 
base for the supervenient impulse to begin with, i.e. it would be better to 
reject the Klein proposal right away.  
Conversely, if we want to give Klein’s proposal serious consideration—
and I think we should—then it is worth considering that the Central Te-
net may simply be wrong. It may not be necessary, in Stoicism, for an im-
pulse to start from an attribution of non-epistemic value. The thought that 
I should eat the food may not need to depend on an antecedent thought 
that the food is good, or desirable, or important to have.  Perhaps the entire 
content of the impulse can simply be, “I should eat this food”.  Of course, 
when I have a vicious desire (epithymia) for the food, then my impulse to 
eat it does obey the Central Tenet: my thought that I should eat the food is 
the consequence of my false belief that this food is a good.22 My thought 
that I should fear death is a consequence of my false belief that death is an 
evil. Those impulses clearly involve evaluations, i.e. attributions of non-
epistemic value like goodness and badness.  But those may be features of 
pathe that are not shared by selection and disselection, and that are not 
essential to impulse. 
And indeed, once we ask ourselves what is essential to impulse, it looks 
as though our best evidence does not give any support for the Central 
Tenet.  That best evidence is the famous statement in Stobaeus (2.86) that 
“what stimulates impulse is nothing other than (ouden heteron all’ e) a 
hormetic impression of the kathekon, simpliciter (autothen).” Seen in light 
of the current discussion, this text speaks very strongly against the Central 
Tenet. An impulse does not require an impression that something has a 
value of this or that sort: all that it requires is an impression that something 
is kathekon. The impression that some action is kathekon, all by itself and 
ipso facto (autothen) is sufficient to generate an impulse to perform it.23 
 
21. I.e., that if it makes a contribution, even instrumental, to happiness, then it is not 
properly indifferent, whereas if it is independent of the good then it violates the Stoic tenet 
that all rational action is directed to the unitary end of happiness. 
22. I.e. on the assumption that epithymia has a two-part structure of the sort that is ex-
plicitly attested for lype and hedone. 
23. If and only if one assents to the impression, of course. The impossibility of an 
impression producing an impulse without assent is exactly the point that the Stoics argued 
against the Academics, as Plutarch tells us (1057A = SVF 3.177). Presumably the phrase “to 
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Accordingly, my acceptance of Klein’s proposal about indifferents 
commits me to abandoning my previous views about selection, and impulse 
in general.  It is possible for me to have a belief like ‘I should eat this food’, 
without there being, anywhere in the impulse, some ascription of value to 
the food. Accordingly, when I take the promotedness-value, i.e. the axia, of 
the food as a sign that I should eat it, I am not taking it as a sign that there 
is some further value that underlies the obligation. The mere thought that I 
should eat it, that kathekei moi phagein, is all by itself (autothen) sufficient 
for an impulse.24 Conversely, it is possible to judge that something is a pro-
moted or demoted indifferent, i.e. has some axia or apaxia, without there-
by having an impulse to select or disselect it. This direction of separability 
will prove important in thinking about deliberation.  
III .  The Consequences  for  Deliberation 
If axia eklektike is semiotic value, then how do Sages deliberate? They 
look for signs of Zeus’ will, in order to figure out what Zeus commands 
them to do.  In general, they will observe many signs, and have to weigh 
them against each other to see what is the most probable conjecture to 
make about Zeus’ command.25 The weighing of signs, I argued above, is 
different from a metretic art of the sort outlined in the Protagoras, which 
attempts to maximize the value of a resultant state of affairs. Instead, this 
weighing seeks the preponderance of evidence, and it seems to be called 
parametreisthai.  
There are two main classes of evidence the Sage considers, as well as two 
sources of background knowledge against which to interpret them. The 
 
de kinoun ten hormen” must mean something like “what initiates the sequence that (after an 
assent) results in an impulse…” 
24. In Brennan 2005, p. 225-226, I noted that discussions of kathekonta that make no 
explicit references to value are not only found in Stoicism, but become more and more cen-
tral to the topic as time goes by.  But I still took them to be elliptical for “phi’ing has or pro-
vides the most value, and in virtue of that value I should do it.” I.e., I was still assuming the 
Central Tenet. 
25. W. Kühn noted that any talk of “conjecture” must be shown to be compatible with 
the Stoic doctrine that the Sage never opines, i.e. never assents to any impressions that are 
not kataleptic. In what follows, I use “the Sage conjectures that P” as a shorthand for “the 
Sage assents to a kataleptic impression that the preponderance of evidence shows that it is 
reasonable that P.” So this is not a kind of conjecture that involves any partial doubt, or any 
likelihood of being wrong. When the Sage conjectures that Zeus commands him to eat (i.e., 
assents to the kataleptic impression that it is reasonable that Zeus commands him to eat), 
then he does not assent in any way to the impression that Zeus commands him to eat. That, 
after all, might be wrong—perhaps it will turn out that he does not eat. But he does assent 
to its being reasonable that Zeus commands him to eat, i.e. to there being a preponderance 
of reasons to believe that Zeus commands him to eat.  And this is something that he can 
know. 
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promoted and demoted things that they can see or anticipate—health, 
illness, food, and so on—are the signs that they use most often.26 And the 
body of knowledge that is used in interpreting these signs is their exper-
ience of what happens by nature, the empeiria ton physei sumbainonton that 
Chrysippus refers to in his account of the telos (DL 7.87). As a second class 
of signs, or perhaps a subclass of this first one, Sages also consider the social 
relations that they bear to others, and which others bear to them.27 Epic-
tetus probably overstates the case when he says that kathekonta are para-
metrized “for the most part” (hos epipan) by our relations (scheseis); the 
knowledge of non-social nature and non-social promoteds such as food and 
health must be at least as frequently invoked as our knowledge of social 
relations in helping us to divine the will of Zeus. The consideration of 
scheseis is also, I think, a matter of semiotics: the relations that I bear to 
other people are indications of what Zeus commands me to do. Epictetus 3. 
11.4-6 tells us that Zeus is the epoptes of such scheseis as “father”, “brother”, 
“guest”, and “kindred” in general, and that I should apply the lines of 
Homer to these cases, saying “I may not dishonor a father, for all fathers 
belong to Zeus Patroios.”  The knowledge used here, i.e. the knowledge of 
human relations in general, is presumably one part of the general know-
ledge of nature that Chrysippus refers to.  
Finally, there may be occasions when the Sage uses unsystematic signs. 
Brunschwig notes that “parfois… [le sage] interprète un événement parti-
culier comme un signe divinatoire,” and illustrates this with the story of 
Zeno’s death, when Zeno fell, broke his toe, and said “I am coming! There 
is no need to yell!”28  Brunschwig asks why Zeno interpreted his fall as a 
warning from destiny, rather than an unremarkable accident. I want to 
suggest that we need not choose between these models. Zeno could have 
arrived at the same decision by treating all of the events as indifferents: he 
observes that he is losing his ability to maintain his balance, that he has suf-
fered an injury to his foot. These are both demoted indifferents, and they 
will lead to more demoted indifferents in the future, particularly when con-
sidered in light of his age. This is the sort of situation that Cicero describes 
in de Finibus 3.60, in which someone has in the present and foresees in the 
future a preponderance of things contrary to nature, and for that reason it 
 
26. Stobaeus 2.86, 12-16 tells us that kathekonta are parametrized by indifferents, sc. the 
natural and contrary to nature. Plutarch 1042D tells us that we should deliberate about 
suicide by parametrizing not with goods and bads, but with mesois.  Plutarch 1063D similar-
ly says that suicide is parametrized by the natural and the contrary to nature. Stobaeus 
2.110, 9-15 gives us the same doctrine, I think, but in slightly misleading terms, when it says 
that suicide is parametrized “tois kathekousi kai tois para to kathekon”.  
27. Encheiridion, 30. (In using the word “epoptes” he may also be thinking of the 
Homeric tag “Eeliou, hos pant’ ephora…”) 
28. Brunschwig 2005, p. 371 fn. 32. 
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is their officium to depart from life.29  The fall and the injury are, at the 
same time, both banal indifferents and warnings from destiny, because all 
indifferents are divinatory signs.  
To see in more detail how deliberation works, let’s try it first for a sim-
ple case in which the Sage is faced with an uncomplicated choice between 
eating food and not eating food, and there is only one sign to be taken into 
consideration. I owe to two of my current students, Katie Mathie and 
Brandon Conley, the suggestion that the steps in deliberation should be 
reconstructed as follows: 
1) I am a human being and I need food. 
2) Zeus usually and in most cases wills that human beings eat food 
when they need food. 
3) Here is some food, which is a promoted indifferent. 
4) The presence of this food is a defeasible sign that Zeus commands me 
to eat this food. 
5) (As a conclusion from 1-4) it is reasonable that Zeus commands me 
to eat this food. 
6) If it is reasonable that Zeus commands me to eat this food, then it is 
kathekon that I eat this food. 
7) It is kathekon that I eat this food. 
The final step of this simplified practical syllogism is an impulse to eat 
the food. On the understanding of selection that I now accept (i.e. select-
ion without evaluation), the final step is an instance of the impulse of se-
lection: I select the food.30 
 
29. I also want to connect the preponderance of promoted and demoted objects in 
Cicero (in quo plura sunt...quae secundum naturam...in quo aut sunt plura contraria aut fore 
videntur...) with the preponderance in the definition of the eulogon axioma as “to pleionas 
echon tas aphormas...” (DL 7.76 = SVF II.201). If Klein is right that axia is semiotic value, 
then a preponderance of promoteds or of axia in those promoteds is a preponderance of rea-
sons to believe I should pursue.  
30. J.-B. Gourinat objected to this analysis on the grounds that talk of “practical syl-
logisms” is more Aristotelian than Stoic.  While I cannot answer this objection directly, I do 
think that it touches on some very deep issues about how one understands the Stoic project 
of rational psychology.  I have always assumed that the Stoic doctrine of rational present-
ations was motivated in part by the belief that adult human agents reason in ways that can 
be studied by Chrysippean logic. More than that: representing human rationality in this 
way involves no distortion of the psychological facts, but rather an exact encapsulation of 
the content that is already causally at work in people’s actions.  When we analyze the action 
of a squirrel in pursuing a nut by attributing a practical syllogism to it, then we are engaged 
in rational reconstruction that fundamentally misrepresents the content of the squirrels 
(subrational) impressions and impulses.  But when we do the same for a human being, there 
is no misrepresentation and no distortion.  Rational re-construction here is the literal re-
covery of something that was constructed rationally the first time. Rationality is built right 
into human psychology: what our practical syllogisms do is not to force vague and ambigu-
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There are three general structural criteria that a successful reconstruct-
ion of deliberation must satisfy: 
K) Each of the beliefs that the Sage has in the course of the deliberation 
must be an instance of knowledge, i.e. a strong assent to a kataleptic im-
pression.  
I) The correctness of the Sage’s action must be immune from the failure 
of their efforts. If they decide to eat, for instance, and then for some reason 
beyond their control they fail to eat, then it must remain true that they 
performed a correct action, a katorthoma. 
P) It must also be possible for the account of deliberation to succeed, 
mutatis mutandis, for a non-sagacious Progressor, i.e. it must be possible to 
construct an ideal Progressor’s deliberation that satisfies a principle K*, ac-
cording to which the beliefs are katalepseis, and a principle I*, according to 
which their action is an imperfect kathekon, but still immune to reversal. 
K) is satisfied, I think, because the first four premises are either particul-
ar present-tensed perceptual episodes (premises 1 & 3) which are can-
didates for direct kataleptic impressions, or they are theorems of physical 
science (premises 2 & 4), i.e. the Sage’s empeiria, which in turn will be 
instances of katalepsis for the Sage or for the non-Sage who has made 
sufficient progress in studying nature. The content of 2 is suggested by, e.g., 
Chrysippus apud Epictetus (2.6.9), saying “God has made me selective of 
such things”.  Chrysippus did not have knowledge of the contents of this 
claim, of course, because he was not himself a Sage. But as a student of 
nature, he can gather more and more evidence and learn more and more 
about the working of nature (e.g. how Zeus has made human beings and 
their instincts), so that he can have kataleptic impressions with contents of 
this sort. 
Premise 5) is a judgment that a proposition is reasonable, eulogon. The 
inner proposition, that Zeus commands me to eat this food, is not itself the 
content of a kataleptic impression. And the Sage does not assent to it. It 
may be false. Zeus may, as it turns out, command that I not eat the food (as 
I shall learn if I fail to eat the food). But the majority of signs point towards 
its being true; it has, as the definition of a eulogon axioma says, “the pre-
ponderance of its aphormai in the direction of being true.”31 Accordingly, 
 
ous impressions into a regimented form, but to report exactly what occurred inside a mind 
that is rational in its very depths.  This is how I understand the Chrysippean project, but of 
course the disagreement between Prof. Gourinat and myself here is a very deep one about 
the historiography of Stoic philosophy, and cannot be settled in a footnote. 
31. DL 7.76 = SVF II.201. This use of “aphorme” must be different from the sense in 
which it is the counterpart of “horme”. It is also probably different from, but perhaps related 
to, the sense in which an aphorme is some sort of innate predisposition to formulate con-
ceptions (e.g. SVF 2.988.21, 3.214.22-23; 3.228.10). 
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the judgment “it is reasonable that Zeus commands me to eat this food” 
will remain true, even if the inner proposition turns out to have been false. 
And this judgment will be a katalepsis, when a Sage or a sufficiently advanc-
ed Progressor makes it.  
Premise 6) is simply an instance of the general definition of the kath-
ekon, and so something that can be known by a Sage or made the content of 
a Progressor’s kataleptic judgment. That definition says that an action is 
kathekon if it has a reasonable justification or defense (apologismos/ apo-
logia). And this action of eating does have a reasonable defense: Zeus 
commanded me to perform it. (More below on why this constitutes a 
reasonable defense). So the general definition—knowledge of which is 
presumably part of what the Sage knows about ethics—licenses all of the 
substitution-instances of “if it is reasonable that Zeus commands me to phi, 
then it is kathekon that I phi.” Accordingly, this too is something that the 
Sage can know. 
And the conclusion, 7), simply follows from 5 & 6 by the modus po-
nens. I assume that it is possible to have a kataleptic impression of the con-
clusion of an argument whose premises are kataleptic.32  
The example above was designed for simplicity. Complexity would 
come by multiplying premises 1 through 4 above. Instead of noting the pre-
sence of a single promoted indifferent, a complex deliberation would have 
separate premises for each of the relevant indifferents or things according 
to or contrary to nature, present and prospective, that the Sage had to 
consider. Some of the references to future indifferents would themselves be 
embedded within reasonable-operators (e.g. ‘it is reasonable that I shall be 
alive tomorrow’).  Instead of noting only one fact about the agent (sc. “I am 
a human being”), it might note the many social roles that the agent fills. 
And then each of these observations about indifferents or roles would be 
treated as a sign, in a separate premise that recorded knowledge of natural 
science or knowledge of politics (broadly speaking): the fact that I am a son 
is a defeasible sign that Zeus commands me to phi; the fact that I am a 
citizen is a defeasible sign that Zeus commands me to psi; and so on.  
Then there is the step from those many considerations, to the con-
clusory judgment in premise 5 (or premise 2N + 1, in a deliberation that 
involved N indifferents or roles). The Sage considers the many promoted 
and demoted things that could be pursued and avoided by various possible 
actions, and the various roles that they and others stand in to one another, 
and in light of all of these considerations, plus their knowledgeable experi-
ence of nature, arrives at an overall, all-things-considered judgment about 
 
32. Sextus, AM 8.396-410, shows that the Stoics recognized kataleptic impressions of 
demonstrations (apodeixeis), which are incorporeal. 
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what it is most probable, most reasonable, that Zeus commands them to 
do. Each of these signs presumably counts as an aphorme, of greater or lesser 
weight, in the determination of where the preponderance of aphormai lie, 
in virtue of which “Zeus commands me to phi” will be a reasonable pro-
position.33 
How this assessment of preponderance takes place I do not know, and 
my failure to say more here may seem to render the account vacuous. It may 
be that the Stoics would agree with Aristotle that universal rules must cede 
to the particular perceptions of an expert, so that nothing more can be said 
in the abstract.  But although my ignorance requires me to leave a lacuna 
where the Sage’s actual ratiocination occurs, the outline of deliberation 
that I have offered is far from empty. It has enough substance to solve pro-
blems and give insights if it is right, or to be false if it is not. It also has 
enough substance to be incompatible with some other proposals—my own 
earlier proposals among them, as we shall see. 
Those reflections show why I think the Mathie-Conley reconstruction 
satisfies principles K and K*. I believe this reconstruction also makes the 
Sage’s katorthomata, and the non-Sage’s kathekonta, immune from reversal 
by the failure of their efforts, thus satisfying I and I*. No future event, 
including the failure to obtain the object of their impulse, renders any of 
their judgments false, or makes the reasonable judgment any less reasonable 
(even when it turns out to be false).34 
The Sage’s conjecture about Zeus’s command remains reasonable (and 
thus their belief that the conjecture was reasonable remains true) even 
 
33. Note that the Sage never needs to assent to “Zeus commands me to phi.”  They can 
move straight from “it is reasonable that Zeus commands me to phi,” to “therefore, it is 
kathekon that I phi”, without ever assenting to the claim that Zeus does in fact command 
them to phi.  
34. And reasonable judgments differ from kataleptic ones in that the kataleptic are un-
falsifiable, whereas the reasonable ones can turn out otherwise, sc. false (Athenaeus 354E 
= SVF 1.624).  To rehearse some material from Brennan 1996: a reasonable judgment is a 
judgment like “I shall be alive tomorrow”, said by someone who has overwhelming reason to 
believe that they will be alive tomorrow, or “Zeus commands me to eat this,” said by a Sage 
or Progressor who has made an extensive study of Zeus’s commands, i.e. the patterns of 
nature. It is reasonable if and only if it has the preponderance of reasons in favor of it being 
true. The standard of reasonableness that makes it reasonable is the reason of the Sage, not 
the reason of an ordinary civilian on the street (i.e. it is not the legal doctrine of “the reason-
able person”). A judgment like “It is reasonable that I shall be alive tomorrow” is not the 
kind of judgment that the Stoics referred to as a reasonable judgment; it is a judgment about 
the reasonableness of its inner contents. So it is possible for “It is reasonable that I shall be 
alive tomorrow” to be a true and kataleptic judgment, even when “I shall be alive tomorrow” 
is false; the judgment about reasonableness is not falsified by the falsification of the reason-
able judgment. The Sage and the Progressor, in the Mathie-Conley reconstruction, do not 
make any reasonable judgments, only judgments about reasonableness. 
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when new information shows that the proposition that they judged to be 
reasonable turns out to be false (as well as reasonable), i.e. even when later 
events reveal that Zeus commanded that they be ill, not that they be 
healthy. This is a consequence of the fact that the standard of reasonable-
ness with reference to which an action is kathekon or not, is the judgment 
of a Sage at the time of the formulation of the impulse. (And this is the 
standard no matter what sort of agent performs the action). The Sage at 
the time of the formulation of the impulse (which will usually coincide 
with the initiation of the action) is an idealized but finite epistemic agent. 
Sages have no false beliefs, and they have knowledge (of a very demanding 
sort) about what things happen by nature (where this includes the social 
roles of human beings). They also have an ample supply of kataleptic im-
pressions about their surroundings, supplemented with further kataleptic 
impressions of what it is reasonable to believe about their surroundings and 
about the future. However, they are certainly not omniscient, and they are 
not prescient: they do not know any future contingents. 
The standard of reasonableness, then, comes to this: if a Sage were to 
consider my position, having all and only the knowledge that a Sage can 
have, would they judge it reasonable that Zeus commands me to phi? If so, 
then it is kathekon for me to phi (regardless of my own motivations, intent-
ions, or reasons for phi-ing). For instance, suppose that I am trying to de-
cide whether to pursue health or illness, and there is nothing unusual about 
my situation. In this case, the Sage would judge that it is reasonable that 
Zeus commands me to pursue health. The basis of this judgment would be, 
for instance, the fact that Zeus himself has disposed me to select health, as 
well as the lack of any anomalous indications to the contrary.35 The Sage’s 
judgment is the best-informed, most knowledgeable, best-considered judg-
ment that any possible finite (non-prescient) agent could make.36  
 
35. Should this lack be explicitly recognized among the premises?  E.g. after the first n 
premises listing the relevant considerations, ought there to be a premise that says, “and there 
are no further relevant considerations”? Probably not; that way lies regress or paradox. Of 
course, a deliberation can be flawed by its failure to consider all of the relevant considerat-
ions, but it is more important for a deliberation to have the virtue of comprehensive con-
sideration than for it to declare such a virtue, just as it is more important for an argument to 
be in Modus Ponens than for it to have a premise declaring the validity of Modus Ponens. 
36. Here I disagree with Klein when he writes: “The sage's assents must be rational not 
in relation to the principles of orthos logos all things considered, but in relation to what she is 
in a position to know about them.  If this is so, it must sometimes be the case that a virtuous 
action is not the action that would be virtuous if every relevant consideration could be taken 
into account.  Or to put it slightly differently, the virtuous course of action for a sage will 
often, and almost perhaps always, be a course of action that in light of further considerations 
would not be virtuous at all.” I disagree that an action could be virtuous to begin with, if it 
was not reasonable in light of “every relevant consideration,” where this means “every 
consideration that an ideal finite human agent could have access to at the time of decision.”  
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Consequences  of  the  Mathie-Conley  Model  of  Deliberation 
One of the features of my students’ proposal that I find especially 
elegant is the way that it first introduces the “eulogon” operator, and then 
later detaches it.  The first premises are not qualified as merely “reason-
able”: they are direct observations of the agent’s current circumstances, or 
theorems of physics. The final conclusion is also not qualified by the 
reasonable operator: if it were, it would not be an impulse. Instead, the 
reasonable-operator is introduced at the stage when the Sage moves from 
the assembly of signs, to the conjecture about Zeus’ command, and it is 
introduced in accordance with the definition of the reasonable axioma. 
And then it is removed by means of the definition of the kathekon itself. 
This model also introduces the kathekon operator only after the agent 
has arrived at an all-things-considered judgment about what Zeus is likely 
to have commanded, and this solves a problem that worried me when I 
wrote for the Cambridge Companion.37  When I thought that impulsive 
content and evaluative content always occur together—roughly, when I 
espoused the Central Tenet and its converse—then it seemed to me that 
there was no room for the circumspect consideration of alternatives. As I 
wrote: 
I have suggested that impulses, which certainly do have evaluative content, 
are per se practical, and sufficiently so, i.e., that they do not need any further 
item in order to produce action. But then it is not clear how the Stoics can 
make room for evaluative thoughts formulated in the course of a deliberat-
ion that will be properly tentative and not lead headlong to action at a 
premature stage...  For the Stoics, some intrinsic motivational force seems 
to be built into the very having of evaluative thoughts, and this makes it 
hard to accommodate deliberation... 
Now I find it easy to spot my mistake: it was the assumption that im-
pulse follows directly on evaluation, that one cannot think of something as 
valuable (good or promoted) without thereby thinking it kathekon to pur-
sue it.  But the sample deliberation shows that this was wrong. I can have 
 
Only such considerations—not facts that emerge later—are relevant to establishing the 
reasonableness of a defense. The “further considerations,” it seems to me, could not show 
that the Sage’s action was not virtuous. It could show that Zeus had commanded the Sage to 
be ill, when the Sage had judged that it was reasonable that Zeus commanded him to be 
healthy. But discovering that the reasonable turns out otherwise is not discovering that it 
was not reasonable. What the Sage thinks reasonable will sometimes, in light of further 
considerations, turn out not to have been true. But it will still have been reasonable, since 
the standard for reasonableness is the totality of information available beforehand, not 
information that emerges later. 
37. Brennan 2003, p. 280. 
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many thoughts to the effect that food is promoted, that illness is demoted, 
and so on, prior to having any thought about what is kathekon—and only 
that last thought leads to any impulse.  
So at least as far as selection and axia are concerned, I now accept that 
one can have evaluation without impulse (i.e. “this food is a promoted” 
without any thought that it is kathekon for me to pursue it), as well as im-
pulse without evaluation (i.e. “I should pursue this food”, where “should” 
does not supervene on a value-judgment; cf. my recantation above).38  
Perhaps with pathe things are different. They are certainly different in 
that the evaluation is necessary for the impulse (since the attribution of 
goodness or badness is partly constitutive of its being an impulse of that 
sort, e.g. an epithymia). And perhaps they are different in that the 
evaluation is sufficient for the impulse. On the one hand, this would make 
the deliberations of the vicious hard to explain, in the way that I worried 
about earlier: if the very thought that something is a good leads inexorably 
to the thought that it is kathekon to pursue it, then how can one contempl-
ate alternative goods without rushing this way and that? On the other 
hand, perhaps it is an advantage, rather than a disadvantage, that this 
analysis predicts that the deliberations of the vicious will be impetuous and 
characterized by the alternation of strong impulses, as one desire or fear 
succeeds another, rather than being properly dispassionate processes in 
which a full consideration precedes the formulation of any impulse. For 
vicious people, the closest that they can come to dispassionate deliberation 
would be something very like the Stoic analysis of akrasia, in which there is 
a rapid alternation of incompatible impulses, leading to childish, tempest-
uous behavior (Plutarch, virt. mor. 446 F-447 A). 
The model is also illuminating, I think, in that it juxtaposes and recon-
ciles two aspects of the kathekon that sometimes seem to point in separate 
directions.  One is the ethical aspect in which the kathekon is the objective 
norm or standard of conduct: the parent of officium, and grandparent of die 
Pflicht. The other aspect is that in which the kathekon is an amoral psycho-
logical passe-partout, the ubiquitous content of any and every impulse, no 
matter how vain or vicious. No impulse to action can eventuate unless the 
agent thinks of the action as kathekon—as Epictetus tells us, thieves and 
robbers all act from the impression that their action is kathekon.39  
What this reconstruction shows, however, is how these two aspects 
come together in the psychology of the ideal agent. From the standpoint of 
 
38. This also means that the status of food as a promoted indifferent does not need to 
vary from one context to another; it is promoted on each occasion, whether it will be kath-
ekon to pursue it or not at that time. Confirmation of this comes from the fact that there is a 
category of kathekonta kata peristasin, but no category of proegmena kata peristasin. 
39. E.g. Encheiridion, § 42. 
 Tad Brennan 
 
60 
teleology, ideal agents will be motivated to act when and only when it is in 
fact objectively correct for them to act. And non-ideal agents perform 
vicious actions exactly when their beliefs about what is kathekon fail to be 
true. That might in one way seem like a platitude—people do the wrong 
thing because they have false beliefs about what is right—but it is not a 
platitude. It is an axiom of certain sorts of rationalism or intellectualism, 
but many philosophers, from Plato to Augustine to Hume, would disagree 
with it. 
Relations  to  the  Lazy Argument 
Another point emerges when one considers the formulation of 5), i.e. 
the premise of the practical syllogism that invokes the definition of the 
kathekon. It might seem very strange to formulate an impulse to phi in 
response to the belief that Zeus has commanded me to phi. For the will of 
Zeus simply is providence and fate and the series of causes; it is the same as 
the law that commands and forbids all things. If Zeus wills that I should 
phi, and Zeus commands me to phi, then I am fated to phi; and if I am 
already fated to phi, why should I have an impulse to phi? 
This, of course, is the Lazy Argument, and I think it is an advantage of 
the current interpretation that it makes it very easy to see why the oppon-
ents of the Stoics raised this objection. We can also see, from this vantage, 
how the Stoics would answer one variation on the Lazy Argument. 
Incompatibilists about deliberation sometimes argue that determinists 
cannot properly account for human action, because they cannot do justice 
to the difference between deliberation and discovery. Deliberation (the 
incompatibilist says) requires that the future be genuinely open and un-
fixed: we deliberate under the idea of freedom. If the future is already fixed, 
if what will be true after we act was always going to be true, then we can 
only discover the future, not create it. But if deliberating about what to do 
really is a different activity from predicting what (it is already determined 
that) we shall do, then the future must not be determined. 
Whether one thinks that this complaint is a cogent one will depend on 
one’s general views about whether deliberation is compatible with deter-
minism. But the Stoic response can now be put in new terms: they will 
deny that there is any deep difference between the activity of deliberation 
and the activity of predicting my own future actions. When a Sage deliber-
ates, they simply try to predict, as closely as their lack of prescience will 
permit, what in fact they will do. And then they try to conform their 
impulses to that prediction. Since the future is unknowable, the best pre-
diction comes from the observation of nature, both cosmic nature and 
human nature, which tells us what we are most likely to do by telling us 
what it is most natural for us to do. It is an imperfect method of prediction, 
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and as a result our impulses, even our most reasonable ones, are sometimes 
frustrated. But if we knew already what we would do in the future, then we 
would turn our impulses to doing that very thing. This line of thought 
shows a different side to the famous Foot Fragment (Epictetus, 2.6.9): it is 
also a repudiation of the incompatibilists’ slogan that deliberation and 
prediction are fundamentally different kinds of activities. They are not fun-
damentally different, says Chrysippus: rational deliberation is just pre-
diction without prescience. 
But then we can also see a new way of thinking about the telos, and its 
evolution among the scholarchs. My end, says Chrysippus, is to live accord-
ing to my experience of what happens by nature. And we have seen that 
thought illustrated above in the idea that I deliberate by trying to discern 
what Zeus commands.  Now Zeus’s laws, the laws of nature, are imperative; 
they prescribe and prohibit, ordering and forbidding.40  But impulse, too, is 
essentially imperative: it too prescribes and prohibits.41 When I succeed in 
predicting what I shall do, and have an impulse to do it, then my imperative 
says the same thing that Zeus’s imperative does: “do thou eat!” for instance. 
This is one way of understanding the homologia and symphonia that are so 
central to Stoicism: what it means for me to live in agreement is that I say 
the same thing that Zeus does. Diachronic consistency is not the issue: it is 
not important that I should say the same thing today that I said yesterday. 
Quite the opposite: I should strive to be just as erratic and anomalous as 
Zeus is, by striving to order myself to do, at any given time, whatever I have 
best reason to think that Zeus commands me at that time.42 And I thereby 
experience that homoiosis theo(i) that Plato introduced in the Theaetetus. 
But as a human being, who must lack prescience, it will frequently be 
the case that I cannot accurately predict what Zeus’ command will be. I 
have an impulse to be healthy, but Zeus commands me to be ill. The com-
mand that I give myself is in conflict with the command that Zeus gives 
me, and this conflict is a failure to agree with the nature. Is it also a failure 
to attain my end? So long as my end is “to live in agreement with nature”, 
then these disagreements do constitute a failure to attain my end. And 
these disagreements are inevitable for a finite, non-prescient human being. 
Even the ideal human agent, the Sage, could not live a life of agreement on 
these terms. 
 
40. SVF 3.314; 3.325; D.L. 7.87 
41. Plutarch, Stoic. repugn. 1037F. 
42. Of course, much of my evidence for predicting God’s commands will come from my 
past experience of nature. The experience, when developed into a systematic and consistent 
science, will be my virtue of Physics, and my knowledge of nature. On this see Menn 1995 
passim. 
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But an end that it is impossible for even an ideal human agent to live 
starts to seem like it is not a human end at all, not an end for a human 
being. This, I think, was the reason why Chrysippus amended the telos-
formulae of Zeno and Cleanthes very slightly: the end is no longer agree-
ment with nature itself, but rather agreement with our experience of na-
ture. This standard, of agreement with our experience of nature, is not an 
easy standard to achieve (only a Sage can do it) but it is at least humanly 
achievable.43 
Apologismos  and Apologia  
The definition of the kathekon tells us that the kathekon is what has or 
can have a reasonable defense or justification. I have said a few things about 
what I think the qualification “reasonable” amounts to, and how it is 
supposed to function. Now let me offer some conjectures about what a 
defense is. 
I have already said that I think the canonical defense of an action phi is 
“Zeus commands me to phi”. That is why an argument showing that it is 
reasonable to think that Zeus commands me to phi constitutes a reasonable 
defense of phi-ing, i.e. shows that phi is kathekon. Why might the Stoics 
have thought that this was a good way to defend an action? 
Perhaps this was another inheritance from Socrates. Socrates gave an 
apologia of his actions. And one central element of his apologia consisted in 
his saying that he had been trying, for some time, to figure out what God 
had commanded him to do. And he had come to believe, as the result of 
investigation, that God had commanded him to philosophize and engage 
his fellow-citizens in elenctic enquiry. He says that he has been stationed 
and commanded to philosophize by God (tou de theou tattontos), in the 
 
43. I wrote about tailoring our impulses so that they conform to what we can know 
about “God’s general and law-like intentions for things like me” by “living in accordance 
with our experience of how things happen by nature” in Brennan 2000, p. 176. Ian Hensley 
is writing a longer paper on the subject of Chrysippus’ revision of the earlier telos-formulae, 
and he points out to me the importance of the word “eiothen” in D.L. 7.88: we are not told 
to avoid doing what the koinos nomos, the orthos logos, and Zeus himself actually forbid, but 
rather what they eiothen apagoreuein, what they typically or habitually have forbidden. 
What Zeus will actually forbid, tomorrow, is not knowable by a human being. But what 
Zeus is accustomed to forbid, what he has typically forbidden in the past, is one part of the 
subject of natural science. I also wonder whether “akolouthia” may have been introduced by 
Chrysippus for similar reasons. If to live homologoumenos te(i) physei means to live in actual, 
extensional conformity to nature, then to live akolouthos te(i) physei, by contrast, might 
mean to live “attentively to nature”, i.e. paying attention to nature, listening to it through 
natural science, and attempting to follow it. That akolouthia introduces some notion of 
intensionality is suggested by Epictetus’ use of parakolouthia in Diss. I. 6, 12-21 and 
elsewhere. 
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same way that his military commanders stationed (etatton) him in battle, 
and he cannot leave that station (taxis).44 The Athenians did not accept 
Socrates’ particular defense because they did not believe that Socrates had 
been commanded by God in the way that he claimed. But the Athenians 
probably agreed with Socrates about the general principle, that a command 
from Zeus provides a sufficient defense and justification of one’s action. 
The language of taxis is very prominent in the Stoic sources, as well. 
Not only are the commands of Zeus themselves described as prostaxeis, but 
Cleanthes also asks Zeus and Pepromene to lead him to the place where 
they have stationed him (hopoi pot’ hymin eimi diatetagmenos).45 If he is 
good, then he will follow, and take his stand readily in the place he has been 
stationed. He will match his own internal prostaxis, his impulse, to the 
external prostaxis of Zeus, and the diataxis to which Zeus has assigned him. 
From the Kathekon  to  the  Telos ,  for  Sages  and Progressors  
The model of deliberation sketched out above still needs to be integrat-
ed into an account of the agent’s end. It is one thing to show that an action 
is defensible, and quite a different thing to show that it can rationally be 
done for the sake of the agent’s telos and eudaimonia. To argue in a court of 
law that it is not illegal for me to paint my house blue or throw my rubbish 
in the street is a very different thing from arguing that those actions are 
constitutive of a blessed and happy life.46 
How, then, does the practical syllogism, which shows that an action is 
kathekon, fit into a larger account of the agent’s end? And how, moreover, 
can we give an account which will work for Sages and also work for 
Progressors, who are not in a position to be able to perform virtuous ac-
tions? The short answer is: by performing the kathekon, both Sages and 
Progressors can act in accordance with nature, and do this for the sake of 
the end. 
Acting According to  Nature ,  Living According to  Nature  
We must make several distinctions. First, a life should be understood as 
a sequence of actions and impulses. And a life is in accordance with nature 
if and only if the actions and impulses that constitute it are in accordance 
with nature. But actions and impulses that are in accordance with nature 
 
44. Plato, Apology, 28e. 
45. Quoted by Epictetus at Diss. 4.1.131 and Ench. 53.1.  
46. Socrates’ speech in court combined the claim that he had been commanded to 
philosophize by God with the claim that a life devoid of this activity is not worth living. But 
surely the combination of these two arguments was not typical of Athenian courtroom 
defenses. 
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do not necessarily correlate with the possession of things that are in accord-
ance with nature. One can have an impulse towards health and yet become 
ill. And one can act on unnatural impulses to be ill, and yet possess health.  
So the actual possession of things in accordance with nature is irrelevant to 
the naturalness of one’s actions and impulses.  And since a life is nothing 
more than a certain structured collection of actions and impulses, it follows 
that a life in accordance with nature or our experience of nature, should 
not be understood as a life in which one possesses the things according to 
nature. So too for the imperfect or pro tanto cases: whether a life is more in 
accordance with nature or less in accordance with nature is not measured 
by what proportion of the time we possess things that are according to na-
ture. Rather, it is measured by what proportion of our pursuits and avoid-
ances are in accordance with nature. 
And here the second important point is that to describe something as 
“according to nature” can either be to describe the input to a deliberation 
or to describe the outcome of a deliberation. When the Sage surveys all of 
the promoted and demoted things that are present or in prospect, as well as 
all of the roles played by the relevant people, this is a survey of what things 
are according to nature and contrary to nature. And at this stage, the 
integrity of the Sage’s limbs (for instance) is unambiguously promoted and 
in accordance with nature, and the mutilation of the Sage’s limbs is unam-
biguously demoted and contrary to nature. But that is only one of the many 
considerations that the Sage has in mind when deliberating. And in weigh-
ing all of the many things that are natural or contrary to nature, and in 
attempting to conjecture about Zeus’s commands, the Sage may come to 
the conclusion that the thing to do is to cut off his or her hand. Let us 
suppose that it is diseased, and that when the hand is weighed against the 
arm, and the life, and the obligations to taking care of elderly parents, and 
so on, it becomes clear that it is kathekon to cut it off. At this stage, in the 
conclusion of the practical syllogism, we should say that this particular act 
of mutilating a limb is according to nature, using that phrase now in the 
conclusory sense. That this act of mutilation can be described, in his case, as 
“in accordance with nature”, is entailed by the fact that the Sage selects it, 
virtuously, and does so as part of a virtuous life, and to live according to 
virtue is the same thing as living according to nature.  
So there are two kinds of reasons why a life could be filled with continu-
ous disease (for instance) and yet still be a life according to nature, even in 
respect of health, even while we reaffirm that health is according to nature 
and disease is contrary to nature.  First because what makes a life natural is 
not the naturalness of the things possessed in it, but the naturalness of the 
objects of the impulses and actions that constitute the life. If one always 
chooses what is according to nature, then one is living a life according to 
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nature, even if one’s choices are frustrated and one comes to possess things 
contrary to nature.  But secondly, because the naturalness of the impulses 
and actions is not straightforwardly determined by whether the objects of 
the impulse are natural in the sense of being promoted, i.e. the sort of 
naturalness that we can identify before doing any complex deliberation and 
weighing. An impulse is natural in the conclusory way just in case it is 
directed towards the same object (e.g. amputation) that a Sage would 
choose, after weighing all of the many signs about what things are promot-
ed and demoted, or natural and contrary to nature in a preliminary rather 
than a conclusory way.47 
So I have distinguished a life in accordance with nature from a life in 
which one possesses the things in accordance with nature, and I have dis-
tinguished preliminary or input naturalness from conclusory or output or 
all-things-considered naturalness. To live according to nature, it is not 
necessary that you succeed in acquiring objects that are according to nature, 
and it is not even necessary that you pursue things that are according to 
nature in the preliminary way (sc. promoted things).  
Next, I think it is important that acting according to nature (prattein 
kata physin) is something that one can accomplish more easily than living 
according to nature. The second, living according to nature, is something 
that only Sages do.  But the first is something that Progressors can do, as 
well. Epictetus’ beginners are sometimes able, at least for a brief time, to 
keep their prohairesis in a natural state. If they could do that constantly and 
unfailingly and from a strong and inflexible disposition, then they would be 
wise. And that is far beyond them. But at least for today, for this trip to the 
bath, they can try to perform one or two actions that are natural. 
In this regard, I propose, acting according to nature is like several other 
Stoic concepts, is being common to Sages and Progressors: katalepsis, for 
instance, or ekloge or the kathekon itself. In each case, both Sages and non-
Sages can perform individual tokens of cognition or selection or proper 
functions, and indeed every non-Sage will inevitably perform many tokens 
of each. But there is another very important fact about these common 
actions. In some sense, the Sage’s virtuous life is composed of nothing more 
than the very actions that the non-Sage, too, can perform. A Sage’s life is, in 
one sense, nothing more than a lot of kathekonta, and a lot of eklogai, and a 
 
47. I want to see if the distinction between the preliminary identification of (e.g.) health 
as natural as an input to deliberation versus the conclusory identification of (e.g.) mutilation 
as all-things-considered natural at the end of a deliberation might help us to understand the 
occasional references to ta prota kata physin. The priority there might not be that of moral 
development (as though the prota are the ones we find natural already in the cradle), nor of 
logical priority, but of whether the designation is intended to apply before or after deliber-
ation. More study needed. 
 Tad Brennan 
 
66 
lot of katalepseis.  But where the non-Sage performs them erratically, and 
irregularly, and from an unstable disposition, the Sage performs them con-
stantly and without exception, and from the right sort of strong dis-
position. These additional properties that make the kathekonta into 
katorthomata, or make the mere katalepseis into episteme, might be called 
“overarching” features, because they act somewhat like the form of the 
arch. There is, in one sense, nothing more to an arch than a lot of stones, 
and any particular stone in an arch could equally well be a stone in a ran-
dom heap of stones48. What makes the stones into an arch, and thus gives 
the collection of stones new powers, is something about the larger pattern 
that they exemplify, and how each one relates to the rest.49 
This makes the conceptual difficulty of becoming a Sage far more tract-
able than it may seem when considered in light of the extreme dichotomy 
between Sage and non-Sage. It is of course extremely difficult in practice. 
But the theory is simple: as a non-Sage, you can already perform kathekon-
ta, employ katalepsis and ekloge, and act kata physin.  To become a Sage, you 
only need to do more of that, and do it more regularly. And eventually, you 
need to do it exceptionlessly, and do it from the right disposition, as well. 
And yet, there is nothing more that is needful for Sagehood than the per-
formance of many tokens of these, in the right sort of exceptionless pattern, 
from the right sort of firm and strong disposition. The non-Sage sometimes 
acts according to nature. The Sage also acts according to nature, and really 
does not do anything other than acting according to nature; however, the 
Sage’s acting according to nature is so regular, exceptionless and rooted in 
their disposition that they can be said to live (not merely act) according to 
nature. The non-Sage sometimes performs kathekonta. And the Sage also 
performs kathekonta; however, the Sage’s performance of kathekonta is so 
regular and exceptionless and so on that they can be said to live in the 
complete performance of all of the kathekonta, as Archedemos said in de-
scribing the telos. And so too for the formulae of Diogenes and Antipater: 
each of the post-Chrysippean telos-formulae show the same pattern, that 
the Sage’s life consist of nothing more than the continuous and exception-
less performance of a class of common actions, any one of which a non-Sage 
may also do.  
This means that both the Sage and the non-Sage can perform the act-
ions that deliberation identifies, not only because they are kathekonta, i.e. 
plausibly in conformity with the will of Zeus, but also for the sake of their 
 
48. It could even be the same stone at the same location in space that it would have 
occupied in the arch, and oriented in the same orientation, but surrounded by a chaotic 
jumble of other stones. 
49. An early use of the analogy of arches and key-stones can be found in the pseudo-
Aristotelian de Mundo, 399b29-33, but its date is uncertain. 
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own happiness. When a Sage deliberates about what to do, and identifies 
something that it is reasonable that Zeus commands, then it also becomes 
apparent to them that doing this action is constitutive of their living in 
accordance with virtue, and is thus an imminent good, a benefit, and con-
stitutive of a happy life.  
When Progressors identify the kathekon action, they cannot hope to 
enjoy an imminent good by its performance: its performance is, in itself, an 
indifferent, and makes no contribution to happiness. However, the Pro-
gressor can still perform the action for the sake of their own happiness, and 
this for two reasons. First, the performance of these indifferent actions is a 
sine qua non of future happiness: Stobaeus, 2.86. 12-16, tells us that if we 
do not perform them, then we will not be happy. And if I believe that E is 
my end, and S is a sine qua non for the realization of E, then I can perform S 
for the sake of E, even if I do not think that S is any part of E, or causally 
produces E, or is instrumentally productive of E. Secondly, I can perform 
the action for the sake of my future happiness, because I can believe, truly, 
that this action is of a sort (the kathekon) such that happiness does consist 
in nothing but performing actions of this sort, organized into the right 
overarching pattern, and that by performing it I will be coming closer to 
acquiring the abilities needed to organize the actions correctly.  If my end is 
to build an arch, then I have good reason to practice piling up stones, even 
if I am not yet in a position to accomplish the particular kind of stone-
piling that is constitutive of arch-building. If my end is to play a concerto 
on the piano, then I have good reason to practice playing individual notes 
and chords on the piano, even if I am not yet in a position to play a con-
certo, both because in one sense there is nothing more to playing a concerto 
than playing a lot of individual notes and chords in a particular organiz-
ation, and because only by practicing now can I come to acquire the ability 
to bring the notes together into an overarching concerto form.  
Thus, whether I am a Sage or not, I can rationally and clear-headedly 
perform these actions for the sake of my end. As a Progressor, I do not need 
to have the false belief that my activity right now is a good of any sort in 
order to think that my activity is for the sake of my good.  
Abandonner  une  partie  d ’échecs  
Finally, I would like to say something about times when an agent selects 
something that is typically contrary to nature, or not promoted.  Suicide is 
of course the most notorious example of this sort of choice, but presumably 
any time that one chooses to go hungry or jeopardize one’s health or em-
brace poverty, one is selecting a demoted indifferent. One does so, in each 
case, because one concludes from a survey of the available evidence that it is 
reasonable that this is what Zeus commands. But since the default assum-
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ption should always be that Zeus commands me to pursue the promoted 
indifferent, what could constitute sufficient evidence that this was not true 
in a particular case, aside from the actual frustration of an impulse to pur-
sue the promoted? If I set out for the grocery store and my car breaks down 
on the way, is that a sufficient sign that Zeus commands me not to acquire 
food? Or does it simply show me that Zeus wants me to take the bus? If I 
take the bus and the bus breaks down as well, should I now conclude that 
Zeus wants me to fast, or that he commands me to continue the journey on 
foot? 
If the rule is that I should pursue promoted things and things in accord-
ance with nature until it is literally impossible that I will acquire them, then 
I will never extinguish my impulses in time to have new impulses for the 
outcomes that occur—I will never desire illness until I am actually ill, nor 
will I ever resign myself to death until I am actually dead. If I must struggle 
for life until life is impossible, then suicide becomes impossible, too.50 
So this must be the wrong model. A better model, I think, is the one 
suggested by our discussion of deliberation: I survey all of the relevant facts, 
and then try to formulate a reasonable conjecture about Zeus’s commands. 
A skilled practitioner of the art of life, I think, will approach these ques-
tions in the way that a skilled chess-player approaches the decision to resign 
from a game. A good chess-player does not postpone their resignation until 
it is literally impossible to win. After all, it will very seldom be true that the 
remaining pieces on the board make it literally impossible for one player to 
win, i.e. that there is no sequence of legal moves that would result in a win. 
A player who played on until this was true would be considered a very poor 
player, a very gross player who lacked all subtlety, finesse, and delicacy of 
perception, and whose conduct was also an insult to their opponent. In-
stead, a good player finds himself at a crucial juncture in a game—perhaps 
after the unexpected loss of an important piece—and surveys the likely 
developments.  He considers his own resources—pieces, position, and 
personal ability—and considers the resources of his opponent.  He thinks 
through the next few rounds, and considers how they are likely to evolve—
or perhaps he thinks through many possible future rounds, but surely not 
all of them. And what he sees is a general diminution of possibility, an 
indeterminate sense that there is only attrition, constriction and loss in the 
future, although which particular game would be actualized if play were to 
continue is far from clear. This prediction is based on years of playing, 
thousands of games, and a broad experience of what things happen in chess. 
It is not knowledge of the future, but it is a reasonable prediction about the 
 
50. This “extinguishing” of an impulse for the promoted thing, and its replacement by 
an impulse for its opposite, is what Brunschwig studied so brilliantly under the title of 
“renversement;” see Brunschwig 2005. 
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future. Resigning a game at the right time, neither too early nor too late, is 
an expert move itself; it shows respect for one’s opponent, and brings credit 
on oneself. 
Something like this must be what goes into the Sage’s decision to pursue 
something contrary to nature, whether a trivial inconvenience or death 
itself. 
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